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DEFINING THE LIMITS OF WETLAND REGULATION
UNDER THE CWA AND THE COMMERCE CLAUSE
United States v. Wilson'
by Stephen S. Davis
Limits of Wetland Regulation
River and consists of about 4,000
developed acres with a population
of 33,000 people at present.'
When completed, the development
will cover more than 9,000 acres
and have 80,000 residents.' The
city was created pursuant to the
New Communities Act of 1968 as
a collaboration between Interstate
I. INTRODUCTION Court to clarify its Commerce and the U.S. Department ofHous-
Ever since the Supreme Clause jurisprudence and resolve ing and Urban Development
Court declared in 1985 that fed- the issue ofwetland regulation un- I The agreement between
eral agencies could regulate wet- der the CWA. Unfortunately, the Interstate and HUD reserved por-
lands adjacent to navigable water- United States chose not to appeal tions of St. Charles for parks,
ways under the Clean Water Act the Fourth Circuit's decision, schools, and recreational areas, and
("CWA"), federal courts have also set aside 75 acres of wetlands
seemed puzzled as to how far to 11. FACTS AND HOLDING near the Zekiah Swamp.' As re-
extend wetland regulation. The In 1996, a jury convicted quired, Interstate and HUD pre-
Court's decision in U.S. v. Lopez James J. Wilson along with two pared an Environmental Impact
renewed concerns about the limits firms he controlled, Interstate Gen- Statement for St. Charles, but the
of permissible wetland regulation eral ("Interstate") and St. Charles statement did not mention any spe-
under the Commerce Clause, since Associates, offourfelony counts of cific plan for development of
not all wetlands are or lie adjacent knowingly discharging fill material Wilson's land within the wetland
to navigable waterways. In US v. and excavated dirt into wetlands area. This statement also did not
Wilson, the Fourth Circuit has now without a permit.I Wilson has been constitute a permit under the CWA
held that wetlands not adjacent to a land developer for over 30 years for development of the wetland in
interstate waters may not be regu- and was declared responsible for question.'
lated under the CWA. This deci- both finns' activities from which this Evidence introduced at trial
sion directly contradicts pre-Lopez dispute arose.3 The development at indicated that Wilson violated fed-
rulings and receives criticism be- issue was located in the planned eral regulations by draining four
cause of Lopez's unpopularity community of St. Charles, Mary- parcels of land classified as wet-
among courts. U.S. v. Wilson land.' St. Charles is situated in lands.' 0 Wilson drained the area by
therefore would have represented Charles County between the both digging drainageditchesto al-
an opportunity for the Supreme Chesapeake Bay and the Potomac low for run-offand buding up the
't133 FF3dr25t C4ithCir. 1997).2 JJames Wilson was CEO and Chairman of the Board of Interstate General Co. L.P. a publicly traded land detolopment
company with 340 employees, 2f000 shareholders, and assets of over 100 million, interstate General was the general partner
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land by depositing truck loads of
fill material over it." The dirt re-
moved in the digging process was
deposited next to the ditches, in a
process termed "sidecasting."
The Army Corps of Engineers
("Corps"), the agency with regula-
tory authority over wetlands under
the CWA, charged the defendants
with violating rules prohibiting wet-
land pollution without a permit.1"
One issue at trial was
whether the parcels should be clas-
sified as wetlands. The government
introduced "substantial" evidence
that the area was in fact a wetland.14
According to the National Wet-
lands Inventory Map and other to-
pographical maps, the area was a
wetland. In addition, testimony and
photographs proved the presence
of standing water and vegetation
typical ofwetland areas, and infra-
red aerial photographs showed a
pattern ofwater currents under the
vegetation." The Corps also dem-
onstrated that water from the land
flowed in a drainage pattern through
intermittent streams and creeks to
the Potomac River, emptying into
the Chesapeake Bay.'6 Finally, the
government introduced evidence
supporting its claim that Wilson
acted knowingly, the mens rea re-
quired for conviction under the rel-
evant regulations.'"
Wilson introduced evi-
dence questioning the government's
assertion that the parcels in ques-
tion were in fact wetlands under the
CWA. This evidence included in-
consistent actions ofthe Corps con-
cerning the land and an intra-agency
memorandum questioning the
classification ofthe area as wetlands
under the Act.'" After deliberating
for 15 hours, the jury returned a
verdict for the government.19
In appealing his conviction,
Wilson argued that the regulation he
allegedly violated was ultra vires, in
that it extended the application of
the CWAs definition of waters un-
der the Corps' jurisdiction to the
parcels ofland in controversy. Spe-
cifically, Wilson claimed that defin-
ing "waters of the United States"
as any waters whose "degradation
'could affect' interstate commerce"
improperly reached the parcels be-
cause it violated the Commerce
Clause.20 He asserted that allow-
ing the jury to justify regulation of
interstate commerce by basing it on
activities that "could affect" inter-
state commerce afforded the gov-
ernment practically limitless author-
ity and offended the U. S. Supreme
Court's recent Commerce Clause
jurisprudence.2' The Fourth Circuit
Court ofAppeals set aside the con-
viction and ordered a new trial,
holding that the underlying regula-
tion exceeded Congress' delegation
of authority under the CWA in that
"Id at 254.
121d.
"Id. at 255. See 33 U.S.C. §§ 1311(a) and 1319(c)(2)(A). The Corps andthe EPA share responsibility for administering and
enforcing the CWA. The EPA has authority to seek penalties for discharge of pollutants into waters of the United States
without a permit in violation of 33 U.S.C. § 1311. The EPA can issue an order requiring compliance with the Act, bring a civil
action for injunctive relief and penalties, or seek administrative relief. The Corps has authority to issue permits to discharge
dredged or fill materials into water covered by the Act. The Corps follows the guidelines established by the EPA in issuing
permits. The Corps also has authority to enforce violations of these permits, and the EPA has a veto power over the issuance
of permits when it determines, after consulting with the Corps, that the dredging or fill materials "will have an unacceptable
adverse effect on municipal water supplies, shellfish beds. . .wildlife, or recreational areas." 33 U.S.C. § 1344(c). See Hoffman
Homes, 961 F 2d at note 2. infra note 54.
'




"Id. at 255. The evidence demonstrated that Wilson made extra efforts in constantly draining and re-draining the land,
shoring up the land through the addition of hundreds of truckloads of filler, and fighting off reappearing wetland vegetation.
In addition. a private consulting firm advised Wilson to apply for a permit from the Corps before beginning development. The
zoning commission in Charles County also contacted Wilson regarding its concerns that he was developing in a wetland
area. Finally, even after Wilson complied with a Corps order to cease development on the land in question, Wilson continued
to develop other parcels without notifying the Corps or seeking a permit for them. Id.
2 d.
'
0 Id. at 256.
Limits of Limits of Wetland Regulation
it encompassed areas not under the




CWA pursuant to its authority un-
der the Commerce Clause, but the
ambiguity of the Act's terms has
caused constitutional confusion.3
The Act prohibits discharges of
dredge or fill material without a per-
mit into "navigable waters."24 The
Act defimes "navigable waters" as
"waters of the United States," an
undefined, troubling jurisdictional
phrase which does not clearly en-
compass wetlands." At first, the
Corps, which administers section
404 of the Act - the section re-
quiring permits for discharging
dredged and fill materials into navi-
gable waters - interpreted the term
narrowly and promulgated rules
accordingly, only prohibiting dis-
charges without a permit into bod-
ies of water that were truly navi-
gable and excluding wetlands from
regulation. 6 However, courts
struck down these regulations be-
cause they conflicted with the over-
all purpose of the Act.2 7
7Id at 256.
221d at 258. This Note deals exclusively with the Court of Appeals holding regarding the Commerce Clause and the regulation
of wetlands under the CWA. Not discussed are the felony violation issues of the Court's decision, such as the mens rea
requirement of the CWA regulations and the associated jury instruction issue. For treatment of felony violations of CWA
provisions, see the following: Richard J. Lazarus, Mens Rea in Evironmental Criminal Law: Reading Supreme Court 7ea
Leaves, 7 FORDmI ~ENv-. L.J. 861 (1996); Patrick W Ward, Comment. The Criminal Provisions ofthe CI-A as Interpretedby
the Judiciary and the Resulting Response from the Legislature, 5 DICK. J. ENvn. L. & POLY 399 (1996): and Christine L.
Wettach, Mens Rea and the "Heightened Criminal Liability - Imposed on Tliolators of the CW-4. 15 STAN. ENrLu. L.J. 377
(1996).
2 3 See U.S. Const. art. I, § 8, cl. 3.
2433 U.S.C. § 1311(a).
25See 33 U.S.C. §§ 1311(a), 1362(12)(A) and 33 C.FR. § 328.3(a)(3) (1993). For a more complete description of the regulatory
development of wetlands under the CWA, see George K. Chamberlin, Annot.. What are "Navigable Maters " Subject to the
Provisions ofthe Federal Water Pollution Contro/Act, asAmended. 52 A.L.R.FED. 788 (198 1); Elaine Bueschen, Comment,
Do Isolated WetlandsSubstantiallyAffectInterstate Commerce?. 46 Am. U. L.REv. 931. 935 (1997). J. Blanding Holman.After
United States v Lopez: Can the CWJA and the EndangeredSpeciesActSurvive Commerce ClauseAttack?, 15 VA. ENrIL. L.J.
139, 165 (1995); StephenM. Johnson, Federal Regulation oflsolated Wetlands, 23 ENVTm. L. 1. 9 (1993) and John A. Leman.
The Birds: Regulation oflsolated Wetlands and the Limits ofthe Commerce Clause, 28 U.C. DAvis L.REV. 1237. 1244 (1995).
26Johnson, supra note 25, at 10.
271d at 360 (citing U.S. v. Holland, 373 F.Supp. 665 (M.D. Fla. 1974), and Natural Resources Defense Councilv. Callaway. 392
F.Supp. 685 (D.D.C. 1975)).
UId at 11-12. See also 42 Fed Reg. 37,122 (1977).
2 9Johnson, supra note 25, at I1-12.
301d. The regulation at issue in Wilson defines "waters of the United States" to include: "All other waters such as intrastate
lakes, rivers, streams (including intermittent streams), mud flats, sand flats, wetlands. sloughs. prairie potholes. wet mead-
ows, playa lakes, or natural ponds, the use, degradation or destruction of which could affect interstate commerce." 33 C.F.R.§ 328.3(a)(3) (1993). See 1ilson, 133 F.3d at 256-57.
4See U.S. v. Rands, 389 U.S. 121, 122-23 (1967) (quoting Gilman v. Philadelphia, 70 U.S. 713. 724-25 (1865)). In Gilman, the
Court stated that "[tihe Commerce Clause confers a unique position upon the Government in connection with navigable
waters. 'The power to regulate commerce comprehends the control for that purpose. and to the extent necessary, of all the
navigable waters of the United States . S.. ."ee il/son, 133 F.3d at 256.
Subsequently, the Corps
promulgated new rules defining
"waters ofthe United States."' The
regulation included wetlands among
those waters regulated.29 The rules
prohibited permitless discharges
into wetlands adjacent to waters of
the United States and, on a case-
by-case basis, non-adjacent wet-
lands whose "degradation" could
affect interstate commerce.3 0 The
authority of Congress to regulate
navigable waters under the Com-
merce Clause has long been upheld
by the Supreme Court." The
present controversy arose because
Vol. 6 *No.1
ofthe regulation's expansion ofthe
reach of the Act from navigable
waters to all waters of the United
States, including those waters
whose "degradation 'could affect'
interstate commerce." 32
In 1985, the Supreme
Court dealt with the authority of
Congress to regulate navigable
waters under the CWA in U.S. v.
Riverside Bayview Hvmes, Inc.3
In that case, the Court upheld the
Corps' definition of"waters ofthe
United States," which included wet-
lands adjacent to navigable wa-
ters.M The Corps filed suit to halt a
housing development because the
developer did not have the requi-
site permits to dredge and fill the
land." The Court limited its discus-
sion to adjacent wetlands because
the wetland at issue bordered the
Black Creek, a navigable water-
way, and the wetland had ground-
water connections with other bod-
ies of water.' The Court stated that
in using the term "navigable" in the
CWA, Congress "evidently in-
tended to repudiate limits" previ-
ously applied to pollution control
statutes in order to regulate "at least
some waters that would not be
deemed 'navigable' under the clas-
sical understanding ofthat term." 7
Thus, the Court concluded, it was
reasonable for the Corps of Engi-
neers to construe the term "waters
of the United States" as encom-
passing wetlands that are adjacent
to what are commonly considered
navigable waters."
Since the subject in contro-
versy in Riverside Bayview Homes
was an adjacent wetland, the Su-
preme Court left open the issue of
whether CWA regulations govern
non-adjacent wetlands." A few
years after the Riverside Bayview
Homes decision, the issue of iso-
lated wetlands emerged in two
cases before the federal courts of
appeals. The first case, Leslie Salt
Co. v U. S., was heard by the Ninth
Circuit; the other, Hoffman
Homes, Inc. v. Administrator,
U.S. Environmental Protection
Agency, arose in the Seventh Cir-
cuit.40
In Leslie Salt, the Court of
Appeals for the Ninth Circuit held
that a wetland lying a quarter-mile
from the Newark Slough, a tidal arm
ofthe San Francisco Bay, could be
regulated under the CWA. 4 1 The
land at issue fell under the Act even
though its characteristics as a wet-
land arose through artificial means.42
In the early part of the century,
Leslie Salt Company's predeces-
sor in interest excavated pits for
depositing calcium chloride and
other pits for crystalizing salt. 3 Salt
production later ceased in the late
1950s, but the pits remained.'
These pits filled with rainwater dur-
ing the rainy season, but wetland-
type vegetation did not grow for
years because ofthe land's high salt
content.4 ' The government later
constructed a sewer line and pub-
lic roads in and around the prop-
erty that created culverts connect-
ing the land to the Newark
Slough.' The area also became
reachable to ocean tidal backflow
when the state highway agency de-
stroyed a tidegate on neighboring
32 filson. 133 F.3d at256.
3 3474 U.S. 121, 133 (1985).




3 1d at 133.
39Id at 131, n.8. The Court expressed. "We are not called upon to address the question of the authority of the Corps to
regulate discharges of fill material into wetlands that are not adjacent to bodies of open water ... and we do not express any
opinion on that question." Id. See also Johnson, supra note 25 at 19.
"
0See Leslie Salt, infra note 41. and Hoffman Homes. infra note 55.





4 1d. at 356.
land." When Leslie began efforts
to drain the land in the mid-I 980s,
the Corps issued a cease and de-
sist order under § 404 of the
CWA.48
The court explained that
government jurisdiction would in-
clude the wetland at issue if it fell
within the scope of Congress' au-
thority to regulate interstate com-
merce.49 The court rejected Leslie's
argument that government intrusion
should not create government ju-
risdiction under the CWA, stating:
[t]he fact that third parties, in-
cluding the government, are
responsible for flooding Leslie's
land is irrelevant. The Corps'
jurisdiction does not depend on
how the property at issue be-





"Id at 357-58. The district court held that the government intrusions could not create government jurisdiction. To allow this
would be to allow the Corps to "expand its own jurisdiction by creating some wetland conditions where none existed before."
Id. at 357.
521d. at 360. The Corps introduced evidence that the land was a habitat for migratory birds who used the pits when they were
flooded during the winter and spring. The Corps also showed that the salt marsh harvest mouse, an endangered species.
inhabited the area.
53Id. The Court did cite cases to back up its decision, e.g., Utah v. Marsh. 740 F.2d 799. 804 (10th Cir. 1984): Palila v. Hawaii
Dep't of Land and Natural Resources, 639 F2d495 (9th Cir. 1981); and Hughes v Oklahoma., 441 U.S. 322, 329-36 (1979).
mId. After asserting that the wetland could be classified as adjacent to navigable waters and, therefore. that the issue was not
a bar to the Corps' jurisdiction, the Court explained that it was still necessary to determine whether the crystallizers and pits
have sufficient connections to interstate commerce to be regulated Id. The Court remanded this issue to the district court. Id.
It instructed that jurisdiction may extend if the district court finds that the area was a habitat for migratory birds or endan-
gered species, as the EPA regulations provide. Id. On remand, the district court found this to be the case and extended
jurisdiction. Id. On appeal, the Ninth Circuit affirmed, holding that the Court of Appeals' previous decision was not clearly
erroneous, and thus., did not warrant reconsideration. See generally Leslie Salt Co. v. U.S., 55 F.3d 1388 (9th Cir. 1995).
"Hoffman Homes, Inc. v. Administrator. U.S. Envtl. Protection Agency. 999 F.2d 256 (7th Cir. 1993).
"Id at 258.
"Id. at 257.
States. Congress intended to
regulate local aquatic ecosys-
tems regardless oftheir origin."o
Because the government acts
changed the nature of the wetland
from isolated to adjacent, the court
permitted regulation, provided that
there was a sufficient connection
between the land and interstate
commerce." The court directed
that jurisdiction would be proper
under the Commerce Clause if the
land provided a habitat for either
migratory birds or an endangered
species, as the Environmental Pro-
tection Agency ("EPA") regulations
instructed." It gave no reasoning for
this finding." In so ruling, the Court
demonstrated that it would go to
great lengths to defer to the Corps'
interpretation ofthe CWA, both on
Limits of Wetland Regulation
adjacency and interstate commerce
issues, for even an isolated wetland
with no natural, hydrological con-
nection to a navigable water fell
under the Act's jurisdiction.'
The Seventh Circuit's hold-
ing in Hoffman Homes can be dis-
tinguished from the Ninth Circuit's
decision in Leslie Salt. The
Hoffman Homes court held that the
EPA lacked jurisdiction under the
CWA to regulate an isolated wet-
land." This case involved an one-
eighth acre piece of land with a
bowl-shaped depression that often
collected rainwater.56 In 1986, a
Corps employee happened to drive
by the site and notice that it was
being developed." Upon investiga-
tion, the EPA and the Corps deter-
mined that the area was an intra-
state wetland, and that dredging and
Vol. 6 *No.1
filling the area without a permit was
a violation of the CWA.5' It was not
disputed that the area had no sur-
face or groundwater connection to
any other body of water, was not
used for any interstate commerce
function, such as fishing or indus-
trial use, nor was it visited by inter-
state travelers for recreational or
other purposes." The EPA argued
that the area fell under CWA juris-
diction solely because migratory
birds could potentially use the area
for feeding, nesting or resting be-
fore moving on to other states. 0
There was no evidence, however,
that any migratory birds actually
used the site.'
The Corps, under the di-
rection ofthe EPA, denied Hoffman
a retroactive pernnit for filling and
dredging the land and filed an ad-
ministrative complaint against the
company when it refused to restore
the land to its original condition.6 2
An EPA administrative law judge
("AL") concluded that the area
was, in fact, a wetland within the
meaning of the CWA and its regu-
lations, but that the EPA did not
have authority to regulate it, since
the area had no effect on interstate
commerce.63 The EPA's Chief Ju-
dicial Officer ("CJO") reversed the
AL's decision, finding that the EPA
had authority under the Act to regu-
late intrastate wetlands that had a
"minimal, potential effect" on inter-
state commerce.' Hoffman then
appealed to the Seventh Circuit






65See Hoffman Homes. Inc. v Administrator, U.S. Envtl. Protection Agency. 961 F.2d 1310 (7th Cir. 1992). In this opinion, the
court held that the EPA could not regulate an intrastate wetland that did not affect interstate commerce. According to the
EPA, even isolated wetlands fall under its regulatory jurisdiction if "the use, degradation, or destruction" of the wetland
"could affect interstate commerce." Id at 1313 (quoting 40 C.F.R. § 230.3(a)(3)). The court examined the language of the
statute. its legislative history: and its stated policy objectives in deciding whether to uphold the EPA's interpretation of it
under the Chevron doctrine. Id It found the language of the statute ambiguous with respect to wetlands in general, that the
1972 and 1977 legislative history failed to support regulation of isolated wetlands, and that the Act's stated policy objectives
did not evidence an intent to regulate isolated wetlands. Id at 1316. The Hoffman Homes court also interpreted Riverside
Baview Homes as denying regulation of isolated wetlands. Id. at 1314 (quoting Riverside BaviewHomes, 474 U.S. at 131,
n.8). The court also discussed wetland regulation under the Commerce Clause. Id at 1317. It asserted that an isolated
wetland, by definition, has no effect on interstate waters and that the EPA had produced no evidence showing that the
wetland affected interstate commerce. Id at 1319-20. The EPA claimed that the potential use of the wetland by waterfowl in
the midst of interstate flight was sufficient to grant it jurisdiction. Id at 1320. The court rejected this argument, replying that
migratory birds, until they are "watched. photographed. shot at or otherwise impacted" by people engaging in interstate
commerce. do not "ignite the Commerce Clause." Id The court ruled that the "potential presence" of migratory birds does not
sufficiently support Commerce Clause regulation. Id
"See Hoffman Homes, Inc. v Administrator, U.S. Envtl. Protection Agency. 975 F 2d 1554 (7th Cir. 1992).
67See Hoffman Homes. Inc. v Administrator. U.S. Emil. Protection Agency, 999 F 2d 256 (7th Cir. 1993).
"'Hoffman Homes, 999 F 2dat 261-62.
Court of Appeals, which found in
its favor on the merits.' Later, how-
ever, the court granted the EPAs
motion for rehearing and vacated
its decision." Upon rehearing, the
court once again overruled the
CJO's decision, but only discussed
the Commerce Clause issue in
dicta.67
In its final 1993 decision,
the Seventh Circuit Court of Ap-
peals held that the potential pres-
ence of migratory birds was indeed
enough to tie an isolated wetland
to interstate commerce so that it
could be regulated."8 However,
since the EPA had furnished an un-
substantial amount of evidence to
establish that the area was a po-
Limits of Wetland Regulation
tential habitat for migratory birds, it state commerce basis. cept the regulation of non-navigable
reversed the CJO's decision." Ac- Ten years after Riverside waters to the extent that they sub-
cording to the regulation, the EPA Bayview Homes,' the Supreme stantially affect the use, potential use
had regulatory jurisdiction over Court put limits on Congress' au- or instrumentalities of interstate
waters "which are or could be thorny under the Commerce Clause commerce.
taken," or "are used or could be in US. v. Lopez.7 ' The Court in Scholars have been busy
used" for industrial purposes.'o The Lopez struck down the Gun-Free theorizing what effect Lopez will
court interpreted the word "could" School Zones Act of 1990, a crimi- have on wetland regulation under
in the regulation as the CJO had nal statute Congress enacted pur- the CWA8 At least one scholar
done, that EPA jurisdiction extends suant to its authority under the believes that the decisions of the
to waters whose nexus to interstate Commerce Clause.7' Because the Ninth and Seventh Circuits may be
commerce is only potential rather intrastate activity at issue in Lopez on shaky ground after Lopez."
than actual and "minimal rather than did not "substantially affect" inter- Because of Lopez, the Supreme
substantial." In dicta, the court state commerce, even in the aggre- Court may now view the connec
maintained that migratory birds af- gate if repeated elsewhere, the Su- tion between isolated wetlands and
fect interstate commerce. 72 Thus, preme Court ruled that the law was interstate commerce as so "tenu-
the court explained that the poten- unconstitutional. 77 In the instant ous" as to say that such regulation
tial presence ofmigratory birds was case, the Fourth Circuit cited Lopez "seriously erode1s] the distinction
a sufficient connection to interstate for the proposition that Congress between local and national con-
commerce to grant the EPA juris- may regulate matters substantially cems."I In particular, the migratory
diction based on a reasonable in- affecting interstate commerce. 78  bird rule "does not guarantee" that
terpretation ofthe regulation.' But Thus, the Wilson court asserts that filling isolated wetlands substantially
the lack of substantial evidence on although the full reach ofCongress' affects interstate commerce. 83the
the migratory bird issue precluded power under the Commerce Clause migratory bird rule as insufficient to




72Md. The court cited U.S. v. Byrd, 609 F.2d 1204(71h Cir. 1979). holdingthat Congress may regulate activities that"affect
interstate commerce, and the Migratory Bird Treaty Act and the Migratory Bird Conservation Act, passed b Congress in
1918 and 1929 respectively, showing congressional regulation of and interest in protecting migratory birds.
731d.
74474 U.S. 121 (1985).
7'514 U.S. 549 (1995).
7
LLopeZ, 514 U.S. at 558-59.
771d at 567.
7
n saItSOn, 133 F.3d at 255-56.
791d In 1997 the Supreme Court issued its decision in Prinz v. U.S. 117 S.Ct. 2365. Although that case dealt with regulation
of interstate commerce. it primarily concerned such regulation in conjunction with state sovereignty issues. It. therefore.
does not significantly add to a discussion of federal regulation of wetlands when no state executive authority is involved.
diSee supra note 25.
stHoaman , supra note 2e5. at 168.
p edC at 195.
unosiutoa3 Inthdistn
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There are two concerns
that the Supreme Court would view
the Commerce Clause." First,
Congress has not made explicit
findings that the filling of isolated
wetlands substantially affects inter-
state commerce." Were Congress
to do so, the Supreme Court would
likely defer to the legislature's rea-
soning, even under Lopez. In
Lopez, the Court found no eco-
nomic activity inherent in carrying a
handgun in a city school. On the
contrary, congressional regulation of
the nation's waters as well as
agency regulation of wetlands have
become historic practices and
gained approval by the Supreme
Court. 6 Secondly, migratory birds
are a "weak weapon" for the EPA
to use because their flyways cover
most of the United States, and the
birds tend to alight almost any-
where." Thus, the court may view
the migratory bird rule as a limit-
less, and therefore unusable, ap-
proach. However, the effect Lopez
will have is uncertain for a number
of reasons. Although Lopez puts
questions on the constitutionality of
isolated wetlands regulation, the
federal judiciary's treatment of
Lopez since it was announced raises
questions ofwhether the Supreme
Court would remain completely
faithful to its 1995 decision."
IV. INSTANT DECISION
The Wilson court first con-
sidered the issue of whether the
regulation exceeded Congress' del-
egation of authority in extending the
definition of "waters of the United
States" to include "those waters
whose degradation 'could affect'
interstate commerce."" While the
defendants in Wilson ("Defen-
dants") did not challenge the Act's
constitutionality under the Com-
merce Clause, they did challenge
the jury instructions and regulations
as both exceeding Congress' del-
egation of authority to the Corps of
Engineers under the Act and Con-
gress' power under the Commerce
Clause. 0 The court held that the
regulation was ultra vires, but chose
not to reach the issue of the limits
of congressional power under the
Commerce Clause." It stated that
resolving the regulation issue was
dispositive to the issue ofthe Com-
merce Clause and that it need not
undertake to answer the "difficult
questions" regarding the limits of
congressional authority under the
Commerce Clause.'
At trial, the instructions al-
lowed the jury to convict ifit found
that Defendants' activities affected
interstate commerce. If those ac-
tivities affected interstate com-
merce, they could be reached by
the regulations under the Act. For
instance, if the jury could find that
"fish or shellfish are or could be
taken" from the waters and sold in
interstate commerce, then the gov-
ernment had established a sufficient
connection with interstate com-
merce to apply the regulation."
41d at 197.
85Id
86See general/v Riverside Bavview Homes. 474 U.S. 121.
87Holman., supra note 25. at 197.
"Judge Luttig's concurrence in if7/son emphasizes that the 4th Circuit has dismissed Lopez. See J'il/son. 133 F.3d at 266.
and also infra note 109.
'




931d. at 256. The instructions regarding the regulation read: "The government must prove that these waters have some
potential connection with interstate commerce. If you find, ladies and gentlemen, beyond a reasonable doubt that these
waters were or could be used by visitors from other states for recreational or other purposes, or that fish or shellfish are or
could be taken from these waters and sold in interstate or foreign commerce. or that these waters were used or could have
been used for industrial purposes by industries in interstate commerce, or that these waters were subject to the ebb and flow
of the tide or that the use, degradation or construction [sic] [destruction?] of such waters could affect interstate commerce.
then I instruct you as a matter of law that the government has established such connection with interstate commerce and that
these waters, including wetlands. are waters of [the] United States." Id.
The Court of Appeals
found this set of instructions flawed.
It found that interpreting "waters of
the United States" as waters whose
use potentially affected interstate
commerce was contrary to the Su-
preme Court'sjurisprudence on the
CWA." The Act prohibits the dis-
charge, without a permit, of pollut-
ants into "navigable waters."9 The
Act then defines "navigable waters"
as "waters ofthe United States."96
The court noted that the Supreme
Court ruled that by defining "navi-
gable waters" as "'waters of the
United States,' Congress intended
'to exercise its powers under the
Commerce Clause to regulate at
least some waters that would not
be deemed 'navigable' under the
classical understanding of that
term. "'" Thus, it was not disputed
that the regulation may extend to
some waters that are not in fact




971d. at 256 (quoting U.S. v Riverside Bavview Homes. Inc., 474 U.S. 121. 133 (1985)).
98Id (quoting U.S. v. Lopez, 514 U.S. 549. 558-59 (1995)).
991d at 258.
'oold at 256 (citing Printzv U.S., I17 S.Ct. 2365 (1997): SeininoleTribe v. Florida. 517 U.S. 44 (1996). U.S. v. Lopez. 514 U.S. 549





sured that Congress could regulate
discharges of pollutants that "sub-
stantially affect interstate com-
merce. " However, the court found
that the regulation surpassed even
this broad interpretation."
Hesitating to embark on a
discussion ofcongressional author-
ity under the Commerce Clause, the
court noted that the Supreme Court
has changed its view regarding
some issues of federalism.'o Be-
cause the object ofthe controversy
was an administrative regulation and
not a statute, the court stated that it
could avoid the constitutionally
troubling Commerce Clause issue,
that would have been presented had
the facts surrounded a statute.'
The court explained that because a
similarly-worded statute would cer-
tainly appear to contradict recent
Supreme Court rulings, a situation
involving such a statute would be
much harder to deal with.102
Limits of Wetland Regulation
The court struck the rule as
exceeding the scope of Congress'
delegation.'o3 It explained that a
constitutionally troubling regulation
did not impose as formidable an
obstacle for it to dispose ofas such
a statute would have, although it did
not elaborate as to why. In striking
the rule, the court asserted that "ab-
sent a clear indication to the con-
trary, we should not lightly presume
that merely by defining 'navigable
waters' as 'the waters of the United
States' . . . Congress authorized
the Army Corps of Engineers to
assert its jurisdiction in such a
sweeping and constitutionally trou-
bling manner."' 4 Not only did the
regulation's definition surpass what
could be interpreted as "navigable
waters," it even reached beyond
what could be regarded as "closely
related to navigable or interstate
waters."o' The court held that by
defining "navigable waters" so
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broadly, the regulation went too tar.
It ruled that the Corps ofEngineers
exceeded its authority under the
CWA in promulgating 33 C.F.R.
§328.3(a)(3) and thus, the rule was
invalid. '0
V. CONWEuF
At some point, the Su-
preme Court should consider the
issue presented in Wilson. Assess-
ing jurisdiction under the CWA and
its regulations is a fact-intensive de-
termination. The facts of Wilson
were distinct from those of prior
cases and amplify the problems
they raised. In light ofthe Supreme
Court's developing Commerce
Clause jurisprudence and federal
case law concerning the regulation
of wetlands under the CWA, the
06Id Eachjudge on the panel filed an opinion. Judge Niemeyer wrote the opinion of the court, while Judge Luttig
concurred in the judgment and filed a separate opinion. Judge Payne, a district court judge sitting by designation,
concurred in part of the Court's opinion and in the judgment, but also filed a separate opinion. Judge Niemeyer's opinion
is divided into seven parts as outlined below:
I.Facts and evidence presented
II.Jurisdiction of the regulation - "navigable waters"
III. Jury instructions regarding wetlands and interstate waters
IVSidecasting issue
V.Mens rea jury instruction
VI. Admissibility of expert testimony
Vl.Conclusion
A majority of the panel adopted parts II, V and VI as well as the ultimate judgment. Judge Luttig only concurred in the
ultimate judgment and only for the reasons stated in Part V Although he believed that Judge Niemeyer's analysis in Part II
was "convincing." he nevertheless declined to adopt it. Wilson, 133 F. 3d at 266. He felt that it directly conflicted with the
Fourth Circuit's holding in Brzonkala v. Virginia Polytechnic & State University, 132 F. 3d 949 (4th Cir 1997). Id In his brief
statement. Judge Luttig asserted that the Circuit has dismissed Lopez as an "aberration" and limited it to its specific facts.
Id. In Brzonkala., the Court held that the Violence Against Women Act did not exceed congressional authority under the
Commerce Clause. See generally Brzonkala, 132 F. 3d 949. Judge Luttig was on the Brzonkala panel and dissented in itsjudgment. If i/son, 133 F 3d at 266. Since filson was handed down, the Circuit has granted a motion for rehearing in
Brzonkala.
Judge Payne adopted Parts II, V, and VI of Judge Niemeyer's opinion and voiced his own views on coverage of both
adjacent wetlands and sidecasting under the Act. Id at 266-75.
07Riverside Bayview Hones, 474 U.S. at 131.
'osM. at 132-35.
'0l. at 134.
"oSee Wilson, 133 F.3dat 254-55.
..'Id. at 254. The facts of Wilson are not entirely clear. For instance, the wetlands at issue were not part of the Zekiah
Swamp, although they were nearby Id. Also, although the case mentions a drainage pattern through intermittent streams
Wilson court's ruling makes sense
but further muddied the water. It
effectively applies the spirit ofLopez
to the CWA, but altered the Su-
preme Court's ruling on wetlands
in Riverside Bayview Homes. In
sum, the Fourth Circuit's ruling in
Wilson raised questions that stand
in need of resolution by the Su-
preme Court.
Wilson seemed to stray
from the Supreme Court's CWA
jurisprudence in Riverside
Bayview Homes. In that case, the
Supreme Court pronounced that
wetlands may be regulated if adja-
cent to a navigable body of wa-
ter.o'0 The Court evaluated adja-
cency according to the broad mean-
ing of"navigable waters" that Con-
gress intended the Act to have.'0o
It reasoned that wetlands con-
nected to navigable waters on the
basis ofhydrological cycles and the
flow ofwater through ecosystems
are sufficient to fall under the pur-
view ofthe Act.'0 As in Riverside
Bayview Homes, the wetlands in
Wilson flowed through hydrologi-
cal cycles to navigable water-
ways. "0 Thus, the facts of Wilson
seemed strikingly similar to River-
side Bayview Homes, although
some inconsistencies appeared."'
The court did not adequately ex-
plain how the facts of Wilson were
distinguishable from those ofRiv-
erside Bayview Homes.
The facts of Wilson were
clearly distinguishable from Leslie
Salt and Hoffman Homes. In
Leslie Salt, the wetland was iso-
lated until altered by artificial
means.112 In Hoffman Homes, the
wetland at issue was completely
isolated, separate from any other
water source or body."I The wet-
land at issue in Wilson was clearly
different in that it was not isolated
in the same sense as the areas in
both Leslie Salt and Hoffman
Homes. Thus, it seems that the Wil-
son court changed the recipe - it
took facts similar to Riverside
Bayview Homes and applied
Lopez-like reasoning. Leslie Salt
and Hoffman Homes held that the
mere presence of migratory water-
fowl justified regulation under the
Commerce Clause.114 Lopez
seemed to conflict with these
cases."' Under Lopez, the appro-
priate question for a court to ask in
considering the constitutionality of
CWA regulations was whether they
substantially affected interstate com-
merce." 6 This was what the Fourth
Circuit did in Wilson. "' It logically
applied the reasoning ofLopez to
wetland regulation under the CWA
In doing so, however, it created
friction with the Seventh and Ninth
Circuits as well as Supreme Court
precedent on wetlands, and thus it
presented an issue that the Supreme
Court snoulo resolve.
The Wilson court's decision
also created some additional con-
fusion. The court commented that
Congress' far-reaching power to
regulate waters that are, in fact, not
navigable "could be drawn into
question by the [Supreme] Court's
recent federalism jurisprudence.""'
But then the Court collected itself
and dismissed the point it just made,
saying, "we need not resolve these
difficult questions about the extent
and limits of congressional power
to regulate non-navigable waters to
resolve the issue before us.""' One
might ask then, why did the court
bring it up to begin with? Such a
remark only serves to encourage
skepticism on the constitutionality
ofthe Act's provision and how it
should be interpreted by courts re-
garding all wetlands under the
Commerce Clause. But perhaps this
is precisely what the court had in
mind.
Were the Supreme Court
to apply a Lopez analysis to regu-
lation of isolated wetlands under the
CWA, it is likely that such a regula-
tion would not be sustained.120 Ac-
cording to one scholar, the Su-
preme Court would begin by inquir-
and creeks, it fails to mention if these were navigable. Id Thus, it is unknown just how isolated the wetlands were from a
navigable waterway.
"
2Leslie Salt, 896 F.2dat 356.
"
3Hoffman Homes, 961 F.2d at 1311, 1314.
"
4 See Leslie Salt, 896 F.2d at 360.
'5See generally Lopez, 514 U.S. 549.








Limits of Wetland Regulation
ing as to whether the relevant por-
tions of the CWA regulate an ac-
tivity that substantially affects inter-
state commerce.121 It would likely
conclude that while the Act as a
whole does bear some relation to
commerce or an economic enter-
prise, "it must be admitted that the
Act does not concern itself solely
with the 'regulation of economic
activity. "'122 For example, the Court
would likely view regulation ofiso-
lated wetlands as having no con-
nection with interstate commerce,
because they are totally intrastate
and bear no impact on navigable
waterways used as channels of
commerce. The migratory bird rule
could establish an economic con-
nection between isolated wetlands
and interstate commerce, but a
Lopez-governed court would likely
analogize the happenstance landing
of birds that fly over state lines to
the potential travel of guns over state
lines to rule that such a connection
is insufficient to establish Commerce
Clause jurisdiction. Whether the
Supreme Court would remain true
to Lopez in considering the consti-
tutionality ofregulating isolated wet-
lands under the CWA is another
question.
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The Wilson court's decision
is unclear in another aspect. In rea-
soning that the regulation defining
"waters ofthe United States" is in-
valid, the court stated that it had no
reason to believe Congress would
authorize such a constitutionally
troubling interpretation as the
agency had given." The court
stated:
[w]ere this regulation a statute,
duly enacted by Congress, it
would present serious consti-
tutional difficulties, because, at
first blush, it would appear to
exceed congressional authority
under the Commerce Clause.
This regulation is not, however,
a statute. 124
It is a well-established
statutory canon of construction that
a court should, if possible, inter-
pret a statute so as not to violate
the Constitution. Apparently, the
Wison court said that it had no such
duty regarding administrative rules.
Such a pronouncement seemed to
conflict, however, with the Chev-
ron doctrine, that when Congress
has not spoken to the matter, an
agency's construction of its autho-
rizing statute should enjoy great def-
erence.22 The court could have
decided, under Chevron, that the
regulation was an unreasonable
construction of the CWA, in that it
was unreasonable to say that the
EPA may regulate all wetlands,
even seasonal pools of water, un-
der the term "navigable waters."
reaffirm Lopez in the wetlands con-
text.
'
23 Jfflson, 133 F.3d at 257.
124Id.
125For an authoritative explanation of the Chevron doctrine, see I KENNETH CuLP DAVIS & RIcHARD J. PIERCE, JR., ADMINISTRA-
TIVE LAw TREAIE i §3.1-3.6 (3ded. 1994).
Instead, it struck the regulation in a
way that appeared to conflict with
Chevron. The court would have
done better to either elaborate and
explain its point or omit it altogether.
VI. CONCLUSION
The Fourth Circuit has now
ruled to prohibit regulation of intr-
astate, non-adjacent wetlands un-
der the CWA. In so doing, it ap-
plied the Supreme Court's revised
jurisprudence limiting congressional
authority under the Commerce
Clause. This decision was novel
because it broke from prior Su-
preme Court precedent as well as
recent federal court rulings regard-
ing wetland regulation. It under-
scored the inherent conflict between
the reasoning ofRiverside Bayview
Homes and the philosophy of
Lopez Lopez. This controversy is
ripe for review and should be re-
solved by the Supreme Court in
order to establish a coherent na-
tional policy.
When given a chance to
address the issue in Wilson, the Su-
preme Court should stay true to its
decision in Lqpez. It should rule that
intrastate, isolated wetlands, be-
cause they do not substantially af-
fect interstate commerce, fall out-
side federal regulation under the
Commerce Clause. Such a ruling
would go far to clear up the Court's
occluded CWA and Commerce
Clause jurisprudence. Ifthe Court
is truly committed to strengthening
federalism and reigning in Congress'
Commerce Clause authority, it must
